A database model for evaluating material accountability safeguards effectiveness against protracted theft

Conference · Fri Dec 31 04:00:00 EST 1993

OSTI ID:61344

Sicherman, A; Fortney, D S; Patenaude, C J ^[1]

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1. Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States). Fission Energy and Systems Safety Program

DOE Material Control and Accountability Order 5633.3A requires that facilities handling special nuclear material evaluate their effectiveness against protracted theft (repeated thefts of small quantities of material, typically occurring over an extended time frame, to accumulate a goal quantity). Because a protracted theft attempt can extend over time, material accountability-like (MA) safeguards may help detect a protracted theft attempt in progress. Inventory anomalies, and material not in its authorized location when requested for processing are examples of MA detection mechanisms. Crediting such detection in evaluations, however, requires taking into account potential insider subversion of MA safeguards. In this paper, the authors describe a database model for evaluating MA safeguards effectiveness against protracted theft that addresses potential subversion. The model includes a detailed yet practical structure for characterizing various types of MA activities, lists of potential insider MA defeat methods and access/authority related to MA activities, and an initial implementation of built-in MA detection probabilities. This database model, implemented in the new Protracted Insider module of ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security), helps facilitate the systematic collection of relevant information about MA activity steps, and ``standardize`` MA safeguards evaluations.

• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 61344
• Report Number(s): CONF-930749--
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

05 NUCLEAR FUELS
DATA BASE MANAGEMENT
DATA TRANSMISSION
DECISIONS AND ORDERS
DETECTION
EVALUATION
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION
SABOTAGE
US DOE