Nuclear modernization and arms control in NATO

Technical Report · Wed Nov 30 23:00:00 EST 1988

OSTI ID:6069032

Kanter, A

The INF Treaty and its aftermath have not simply returned NATO to a world without ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), Pershing II, and the SS-20, but have crystallized and reinforced long-standing questions about the credibility of NATO's strategy of flexible response, the appropriate role of theater nuclear weapons in the future, and the prospects for continued U.S. leadership of the Alliance. These issues come together in a consideration of whether and how NATO should modernize its remaining nuclear forces. This Note analyzes different ways in which NATO can respond to the nuclear requirements that flow from its strategy. It considers how INF Treaty constraints and prospective START limits, as well as the special place and concerns of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), bear on the various possibilities. It also assesses the implications of different choices for Alliance cohesion, U.S. leadership of NATO, and extended deterrence. On the basis of that analysis, it describes an approach to NATO nuclear modernization and arms control.

• Research Organization: Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA (USA)
• OSTI ID: 6069032
• Report Number(s): AD-A-228129/3/XAB; RAND/N--2896-FF
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

350100* -- Arms Control-- Policy
Negotiations
& Legislation-- (1987-)
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
CRUISE MISSILES
EUROPE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
MILITARY STRATEGY
MISSILES
NATO
NORTH AMERICA
NUCLEAR FORCES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TREATIES
USA
WEAPONS
WESTERN EUROPE