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Oligopolistic markets for nonrenewable natural resources

Journal Article · · Q. J. Econ.; (United States)
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2307/1885089· OSTI ID:6047236

Noncooperative oligopoly behavior in nonrenewable resource markets is analyzed under stationary conditions assuming perfect information. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in output paths is established under standard cost and demand assumptions, and a number of comparative dynamic results are obtained. If all suppliers have the same costs, for instance, and total reserves are fixed, either increasing the number of suppliers or equalizing their reserve holdings causes more rapid resource use. If suppliers' costs differ, it is shown that equilibrium involves inefficient production; high-cost reserves may even be exhausted before low-cost reserves. 24 references.

Research Organization:
Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., Cambridge
OSTI ID:
6047236
Journal Information:
Q. J. Econ.; (United States), Journal Name: Q. J. Econ.; (United States) Vol. 95:3; ISSN QJECA
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English