Information and bidding behavior by major oil companies for outer continental shelf leases: is the joint-bidding ban justified
- Appalachian State Univ., Boone, NC
The Gaskins and Vann (G and V) hypothesis assumes that information gained during joint-bidding negotiations is used to increase the chances of winning on other OCS lease tracts. A review of the G and V model concludes that it lacks empirical content and finds all competition to be equal. The trend of legislative and administrative events that began with the joint bidding ban continues with various unconventional techniques, such as royalty bidding and fixed-net profit share bidding. To the extent that these unconventional systems are meant to be mechanisms for correcting anticompetitive bidding abuses of the traditional bonus bid, the rejection of G and V's information hypothesis suggests that these new systems may be unnecessary. 21 references, 5 tables.
- OSTI ID:
- 6045817
- Journal Information:
- Energy J.; (United States), Journal Name: Energy J.; (United States) Vol. 2:3; ISSN ENJOD
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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