Patterns of innovation in weapons acquisition decisions: the case of the long-range cruise missile
This study was conducted to determine why organizations can appear innovative on some occasions, and non-innovative on others. The particular focus of the study concerns two comparable organizations - the US Air Force and the US Navy - which responded differently to the opportunity for weapons innovation presented by a promising technology, the long-range cruise missile. Explanations for weapons innovation and acquisition decisions are traditionally found in four approaches: arms-race models; rational actor models; bureaucratic and cybernetics models; and idiographic case studies. None of these approaches is sufficient to offer general, stable, and consistent predictions about weapons innovation. Research outside of political science offers some insights. This literature was reviewed to develop a four-fold matrix describing patterns of behavior when a given organization confronts an opportunity to innovate at a given time. Because of significant differences between the two organizations in terms of goal consensus, significant differences in behavior were found. The air Force strongly resisted the cruise missile, while the Navy incrementally adopted it. While the entire matrix could not be tested, conclusions could be drawn.
- Research Organization:
- Minnesota Univ., Minneapolis (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6042658
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: Thesis (Ph. D)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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