Utility of de-escalatory confidence-building measures
This paper evaluates the utility of specific confidence-building de-escalatory measures and pays special attention to the evaluation of measures which place restrictions on or establish procedures for strategic forces. Some measures appear more promising than others. Potentially useful confidence-building measures largely satisfy defined criteria and include the phased return of strategic nuclear forces to peacetime bases and operations, the termination of interference with communications and NTMs (National Technical Means) and the termination of civil defense preparations. Less-promising CBMs include the standing down of supplemental early warning systems, the establishment of SSBN keep-out zones, and decreases in bomber alert rates. Establishment of SSBN keep-out zones and reduction in bomber rates are difficult to verify, while the standing-down of early warning systems provides little benefit at potentially large costs. Particular confidence-building measures (CBMs) may be most useful in building superpower confidence at specific points in the crisis termination phase. For example, a decrease in strategic bomber alert rates may provide some decrease in perception of the likelihood of war, but its potential costs, particularly in increasing bomber vulnerability, may limit its utility and implementation to the final crisis stages when the risks of re-escalation and surprise attack are lower.
- Research Organization:
- Rand Corp., Santa Monica, CA (USA)
- OSTI ID:
- 6023581
- Report Number(s):
- AD-A-228107/9/XAB; RAND/P-7571
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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