International cooperation in stockpiles and tariffs for coping with oil supply disruptions

Journal Article · · J. Policy Model.; (United States)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/0161-8938(85)90021-3· OSTI ID:6017153

Murphy, F H; Toman, M A; Weiss, H J

This paper provides a unified treatment of oil stockpiling and demand restraint as policy responses for enhancing energy security and examines the implications of recent changes in the structure and performance of the international oil market for the design of policies. These issues are addressed using a dynamic programming framework in which international policy actions of key-oil-importing countries are modeled as a Nash dynamic game. Significant policy implications from the analysis include: (1) the result that, with realistic assumptions about disruption risks and inventory capacities, differences between noncooperative and coordinated stockpile policies appear to be minor and (2) significant mutual gains could be reaped from a modest degree of collective restraint on normal market oil demand. The broader role of international cooperation in enhancing energy security is also discussed. 27 references, 6 tables.

• Research Organization: Temple Univ., Washington, DC
• DOE Contract Number: AC01-80PE70267
• OSTI ID: 6017153
• Journal Information: J. Policy Model.; (United States), Journal Name: J. Policy Model.; (United States) Vol. 7:4; ISSN JPMOD
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

02 PETROLEUM
020700* -- Petroleum-- Economics
Industrial
& Business Aspects
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
294002 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Petroleum
COOPERATION
ENERGY POLICY
ENERGY SOURCES
FOSSIL FUELS
FUELS
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
MARKET
PETROLEUM
STOCKPILES
SUPPLY DISRUPTION
TARIFFS