Verifying START: From satellites to suspect sites

Journal Article · Mon Oct 01 00:00:00 EDT 1990 · Arms Control Today; (USA)

OSTI ID:5967615

Lockwood, D ^[1]

---

1. Arms Control Association, Washington, DC (USA)

When applied together, NTM (national technical means), inspections, and cooperative measures will have a synergistic effect, giving the United States high confidence that it can detect any militarily significant START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) violation. Give the large strategic retaliatory capability both sides will retain under a START treaty, only large-scale cheating would be militarily significant, and there is little doubt such cheating could be easily detected. While counting mobile ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles) will be more difficult than monitoring fixed silos, the web of verification provisions now agreed upon will answer the challenge. A large number of ICBMs cannot be maintained and operated without a massive supporting infrastructure, including command and control, deployment, maintenance, and testing facilities. The large covert infrastructure needed to deploy even a few hundred illegal mobile ICBM warheads would surely be detected. Further, the United States should be able to detect any recurring pattern of small violations.

• OSTI ID: 5967615
• Journal Information: Arms Control Today; (USA), Vol. 20:8; ISSN 0196-125X
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ARMS CONTROL
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
VERIFICATION
NUCLEAR EXPLOSION DETECTION
AGREEMENTS
SALT TALKS
USA
USSR
ASIA
DETECTION
EASTERN EUROPE
EUROPE
NORTH AMERICA
TREATIES
450300* - Military Technology
Weaponry
& National Defense- Nuclear Explosion Detection
350300 - Arms Control- Verification- (1987-)