Redundant and independent containment and surveillance systems

Conference · Sun Apr 01 04:00:00 UTC 1990

OSTI ID:5758246

Drayer, D D; Sonnier, C S; Mangan, D L ^[1]; Walford, F ^[2]

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1. Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)
2. UKAEA Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell (UK)

Facilities are now coming under Agency safeguards which have large amounts of nuclear material and/or nuclear material which is very difficult to access for reverification. Containment and Surveillance (C/S) technologies may be used to assist in resolution of this problem. This study examines the concept of redundant and independent C/S Systems, and discusses how these systems could be used to lower the need for remeasurement of materials which are difficult to access, or materials included in very large inventories. This paper dose not address increasing levels of C/S measures to protect different types of materials. However, the paper does discuss how redundant and independent C/S Systems will improve the reliability of safeguards information. Equipment which may be used in such systems, and examples of potential systems, are presented. Decisions on how much C/S equipment is enough for a given facility, or type of material, must be made by the inspectorate. 6 refs., 4 figs.

• Research Organization: Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (USA)
• Sponsoring Organization: DOE/NE
• DOE Contract Number: AC04-76DP00789
• OSTI ID: 5758246
• Report Number(s): SAND-90-0806; ISPO--314; SRDP-R--163; CONF-9007106--18; ON: DE90011254
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055000* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
ACTINIDES
CONTAINMENT
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
CONTROL SYSTEMS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
ELEMENTS
ENERGY SOURCES
ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEMS
ENTRY CONTROL SYSTEMS
EUROPE
FISSILE MATERIALS
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
FUELS
INVENTORIES
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
METALS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR FUELS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PLUTONIUM
REACTOR MATERIALS
SAFEGUARDS
SECURITY
SPENT FUELS
STORAGE FACILITIES
SURVEILLANCE
TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS
UNITED KINGDOM