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U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Optimal allocation of federal coal land among competing uses

Thesis/Dissertation ·
OSTI ID:5742528
Using the techniques of optimal control theory, it is demonstrated that under usual perfect market assumptions, profit-maximizing firms will mine coal and reclaim the surface so that the sum of coal and surface rents are maximized. Moreover, it is shown that firms' mining and reclamation decisions will also maximize utilitarian social welfare. These results extend the theory of exhaustible resources which has ignored opportunity costs of surface disruption due to mining. Traditional theory has shown that firms should deplete resources at a rate that equates price to the sum of marginal extraction cost and the marginal value (user cost) of an unextracted unit of the resource. It is shown here that when surface disruption will occur, firms should equate price to the sum of marginal extraction cost, user cost, and marginal loss in surface value. Moreover, the result holds even if surface loss is irreversible. Unlike earlier theoretical work, the findings do not imply that mining should cease before the profitability of further mining reaches zero. These results suggest that the historic policy of leasing coal to private firms is consistent with welfare maximization. Furthermore, the findings indicate that federally mandated reclamation requirements will occasionally result in inefficient mining and reclamation. However, when external costs of surface mining are present, a strong government role is warranted.
OSTI ID:
5742528
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English