A confirmatory measurement technique for highly enriched uranium

Conference · Thu Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1987 · Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA)

OSTI ID:5693615

Sprinkle, Jr, J K; Russo, P A; Goldman, A; Stovall, L A; Brumfield, T L; Gunn, C; Watson, D ^[1]

---

1. Los Alamos National Lab., NM (USA)

Present US Department of Energy regulations require that the receiver of a special nuclear material (SNM) shipment perform an input accountability measurement within 10 calendar days of receipt of the shipment. In cases where this measurement is not possible, a confirmatory measurement may be used on an interim basis to accept the transfer. It has been proposed that a confirmatory measurement should deal with the material control issue, specifically, whether any SNM has been diverted or lost. In this definition of a confirmatory measurement, the result is reported in counts per second. If a confirmatory measurement demonstrates that no SNM is missing, the transfer could be considered successful and the 741 form could be closed. The proposed definition of a confirmatory measurement leads to certain requirements for the actual measurement system for highly enriched uranium: (1) A measurement precision of 1% or better (one relative {sigma}) on a unique attribute of the SNM is required. (2) If the confirmatory measurement is used to deduce a sample mass, a nominal measurement accuracy of 10% (1{sigma}) is reasonable. (3) Short count times with a minimum of sample preparation are needed. (4) Minimal cost for capital equipment and the personnel to operate it are necessary. (5) The confirmatory measurement should be hard to fool with a bogus item.

• OSTI ID: 5693615
• Report Number(s): CONF-871110--
• Conference Information: Journal Name: Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA) Journal Volume: 55
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
ACCURACY
ACTINIDES
DOCUMENTATION
ECONOMICS
ELEMENTS
ENRICHED URANIUM
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS
MANAGEMENT
MATERIALS
MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
METALS
NAI DETECTORS
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
RADIATION DETECTORS
SCINTILLATION COUNTERS
SOLID SCINTILLATION DETECTORS
URANIUM
US DOE
US ORGANIZATIONS