Confirmatory measurements of special nuclear materials
Conference
·
OSTI ID:5659983
Confirmatory measurements have been considered to be interim measures until accountability measurements could be performed. When the objectives of the measurements are defined and, measurement techniques selected to attain these objectives, confirmatory type measurements can significantly increase the effectiveness of the safeguards system and in some cases may be preferred to accountability measurements for safeguards purposes. The use of fingerprint type confirmatory measurements can provide highly reliable data to ensure no diversion of SNM has occurred. These measurements can be made quickly to provide rapid assessments of SNM in shipping or storage containers. The use of fingerprint type measurements at SRP on enriched uranium shipments was shown to provide assurance at a high confidence level that no diversion of SNM could have occurred. The objective of the 10 day DOE requirement for accountability measurements is to provide a rapid assessment of SNM quantity for safeguards purposes. In cases where confirmatory or fingerprint measurements have provided assurance that no diversion has occurred, the safeguards system is not compromised by delay of the accountability measurements. The accountability measurements can then be performed for inventory purposes without undue time constraints in a more cost effective and efficient manner. 1 fig.
- Research Organization:
- USDOE Savannah River Operations Office, Aiken, SC
- OSTI ID:
- 5659983
- Report Number(s):
- DOE/SR-3; CONF-850765-11; ON: DE85014936
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTING
ACTINIDES
DETECTION
ELEMENTS
MANAGEMENT
MEASURING METHODS
METALS
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PLUTONIUM
SAFEGUARDS
SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT
TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS
URANIUM
US AEC
US DOE
US ERDA
US ORGANIZATIONS
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTING
ACTINIDES
DETECTION
ELEMENTS
MANAGEMENT
MEASURING METHODS
METALS
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PLUTONIUM
SAFEGUARDS
SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT
TRANSURANIUM ELEMENTS
URANIUM
US AEC
US DOE
US ERDA
US ORGANIZATIONS