Notes on the MUF-D statistic

Conference · Wed Dec 31 23:00:00 EST 1986 · Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA)

OSTI ID:5626149

Picard, R R ^[1]

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1. Los Alamos National Lab., NM (USA)

Verification of an inventory or of a reported material unaccounted for (MUF) calls for the remeasurement of a sample of items by an inspector followed by comparison of the inspector's data to the facility's reported values. Such comparison is intended to protect against falsification of accounting data that could conceal material loss. In the international arena, the observed discrepancies between the inspector's data and the reported data are quantified using the D statistic. If data have been falsified by the facility, the standard deviations of the D and MUF-D statistics are inflated owing to the sampling distribution. Moreover, under certain conditions the distributions of those statistics can depart markedly from normality, complicating evaluation of an inspection plan's performance. Detection probabilities estimated using standard deviations appropriate for the no-falsification case in conjunction with assumed normality can be far too optimistic. Under very general conditions regarding the facility's and/or the inspector's measurement error procedures and the inspector's sampling regime, the variance of the MUF-D statistic can be broken into three components. The inspection's sensitivity against various falsification scenarios can be traced to one or more of these components. Obvious implications exist for the planning of effective inspections, particularly in the area of resource optimization.

• OSTI ID: 5626149
• Report Number(s): CONF-871110--
• Journal Information: Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA), Journal Name: Transactions of the American Nuclear Society; (USA) Vol. 55; ISSN TANSA; ISSN 0003-018X
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTABILITY
ERRORS
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
INSPECTION
INVENTORIES
MANAGEMENT
MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR
MATHEMATICS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
PERFORMANCE
SAFEGUARDS
SAMPLING
STATISTICS