A methodology for identifying, evaluating, and controlling the incremental risk of inadvertent sensitive information disclosure during on-site verification inspections at US facilities
From both the standpoints of national security impact and commercial advantage, on-site arms control agreement verification inspections pose serious concerns because of the possibility of inadvertent sensitive information disclosure to foreign inspectors. Thus, need has been satisfied most recently in connection with the United States' offer to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to carry out on-site nuclear materials safeguards inspections at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant. An approach to identifying, evaluating, and minimizing the risk of inadvertent compromise of sensitive information was used and has proved to be most effective. It should be equally applicable to quantifying the risk of disclosure during on-site inspections for arms control verifications.
- Research Organization:
- Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-84OT21400
- OSTI ID:
- 5617263
- Report Number(s):
- K/ITP-290; CONF-8908141-2; ON: DE89016878
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: U.S. Department of Energy conference on technology research and development for arms control verification, Los Alamos, NM, USA, 29-31 Aug 1989; Other Information: Portions of this document are illegible in microfiche products
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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