Controllable unit approach to material control: application to a high through-put mixed oxide process. [200-MT plant]
CUA was applied to a 200-metric-ton mixed-oxide (4% PuO/sub 2/ in UO/sub 2/) process scheduled for completion in the 1980's. The performance criterion used was to detect a loss (single or cumulative) of 2 kg of PuO/sub 2/ from the mixed-oxide process over a two-month inventory period with a detection probability of 97.5%, and to detect the loss within one day of reaching the 2-kg magnitude. Since the mixed-oxide process does not yet exist, a detailed computer simulation program was developed based on a license application for a fuel fabrication plant proposed by the Westinghouse Corporation. In order to control the PuO/sub 2/, all process, quality, and material control measurements proposed by the licensee were taken into account through the formulation of closure equations. Although the CUA methodology suggested several specific refinements to the material control system, the results of this study show that the mixed-oxide process can meet the stated performance criterion without substantial modifications of the process or material control system.
- Research Organization:
- Mound Facility, Miamisburg, OH (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- EY-76-C-04-0053
- OSTI ID:
- 5600266
- Report Number(s):
- NUREG/CR-1214(Vol.1); MLM-2532(Vol.1)
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
055001* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACTINIDE COMPOUNDS
CHALCOGENIDES
COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
DETECTION
FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
LOSSES
MANAGEMENT
MIXED OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
OXIDES
OXYGEN COMPOUNDS
PERFORMANCE
PLUTONIUM COMPOUNDS
PLUTONIUM DIOXIDE
PLUTONIUM OXIDES
SIMULATION
TRANSURANIUM COMPOUNDS
URANIUM COMPOUNDS
URANIUM DIOXIDE
URANIUM OXIDES
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACTINIDE COMPOUNDS
CHALCOGENIDES
COMPUTERIZED SIMULATION
DETECTION
FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
LOSSES
MANAGEMENT
MIXED OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
OXIDES
OXYGEN COMPOUNDS
PERFORMANCE
PLUTONIUM COMPOUNDS
PLUTONIUM DIOXIDE
PLUTONIUM OXIDES
SIMULATION
TRANSURANIUM COMPOUNDS
URANIUM COMPOUNDS
URANIUM DIOXIDE
URANIUM OXIDES