Insider protection: a report card
Enhanced security measures against external threats (e.g., terrorists, criminals) have been implemented at most facilities that handle special nuclear material, classified information, or other assets critical to national security. Attention is not focussing on insider protection, and safeguards managers are attempting to provide balanced protection against insider and outsider threats. Potential insider threats include attempts by facility employees to steal special nuclear material (SNM), to cause a radiological hazard to the public, to sabotage critical facilities, or to steal property or classified information. This paper presents a report card on the status of insider protection at Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, with emphasis on SNM theft. We discuss the general trends in insider protection and the limitations of protection measures currently in use. We also discuss the most critical needs for improved procedures, technology, analytical tools, and education for safeguards personnel.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 5541804
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-94320; CONF-860654-34; ON: DE86013224
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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