Offering excess US fissile materials for IAEA safeguards
- Dept. of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)
- JUPITER Corp., Wheaton, MD (United States)
In his September 1993 nonproliferation policy announcement, President Clinton described an initiative to submit U.S. excess fissile material for international safeguards. This set in motion U.S. government agency activities in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and elsewhere to begin identifying materials judged no longer needed for the U.S. deterrent. At the same time, preparations for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safe-guards were begun at a few DOE sites. In September 1994, the IAEA selected a facility at the Oak Ridge site and began applying safeguards to excess highly enriched uranium (HEU). In March 1995 the President declared that {approximately}200 tonnes of fissile materials would no longer be needed for national security purposes and would, therefore, be declared excess. In February 1996 the Secretary of Energy announced specific quantities and locations of excess HEU and plutonium. In early September 1996, recommendations prepared by the DOE on the international safeguarding of excess materials were approved by the National Security Council. These recommendations outlined the steps to be taken to make excess fissile material available for international safeguards. The principal responsibility for carrying out this program was assigned to the DOE. By this time IAEA inspections had also begun at the Hanford and Rocky Flats sites. The DOE has identified four general categories of excess materials. Category 1 consists of {approximately}12 tonnes of material under IAEA safeguards at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. Category 2 includes 27.6 t of HEU that is expected to be made available in the next several years. Category 3 is composed of {approximately}85 t of HEU and plutonium that is currently being evaluated within the DOE to determine the amount of this material that can be made available for IAEA safeguards. The final category consists of more than 100 tonnes of excess materials in classified forms.
- OSTI ID:
- 552393
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-971125--
- Journal Information:
- Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, Journal Name: Transactions of the American Nuclear Society Vol. 77; ISSN TANSAO; ISSN 0003-018X
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Implementation of neutron counting techniques at US facilities for IAEA verification of excess materials from nuclear weapons production
The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface