Resolving inventory differences

Conference · Tue Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1991 · Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States)

OSTI ID:5516592

Weber, J H; Clark, J P ^[1]

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1. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC (US)

This paper reports that determining the cause of an inventory difference (ID) that exceeds warning or alarm limits should not only involve investigation into measurement methods and re-examination of the model assumptions used in the calculation of the limits, but also result in corrective actions that improve the quality of the accountability measurements. An example illustrating methods used by Savannah River Site (SRS) personnel to resolve an ID is presented that may be useful to other facilities faced with a similar problem. After first determining that no theft or diversion of material occurred and correcting any accountability calculation errors, investigation into the IDs focussed on volume and analytical measurements, limit of error of inventory difference (LEID) modeling assumptions, and changes in the measurement procedures and methods prior to the alarm. There had been a gradual gain trend in IDs prior to the alarm which was reversed by the alarm inventory. The majority of the nuclear materials in the facility was stored in four large tanks which helped identify causes for the alarm.

• OSTI ID: 5516592
• Report Number(s): CONF-910774--
• Conference Information: Journal Name: Nuclear Materials Management. Annual Meeting Proceedings; (United States) Journal Volume: 20
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

055000* -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACCOUNTING
CORRECTIONS
ERRORS
INVENTORIES
MANAGEMENT
MATTER
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
NUCLEAR MATTER
PERSONNEL
SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT
US AEC
US DOE
US ERDA
US ORGANIZATIONS