Powerplant productivity improvements and regulatory incentives. Volume II
Appendices Volume II contain a number of highly rigorous proofs for some of the major assertions made in the text. Basically, these proofs relate to: the inability of rate of return regulation to encourage utilities to select a cost-minimal mix of inputs during periods of rapid growth; the capability of a voluntary incentive plan with design characteristics similar to the general format developed in this study to improve the characteristics of rate of return regulation in that area; and, the effectiveness of the general incentive format in a dynamic as well as a static setting. The primary argument in behalf of the general incentive format is that it clearly offers to rate of return regulation a strong connection between profit and efficiency (which is the primary incentive for cost minimization in a functioning competitive market). The proofs do not cover all the beneficiary aspects of the general incentive format. Those that are not included are intuitive.
- Research Organization:
- Texas Energy and Natural Resources Advisory Council, Austin (USA); Texas Univ., Austin (USA). Center for Energy Studies
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC01-78RG06667
- OSTI ID:
- 5516239
- Report Number(s):
- DOE/RG/06667-T2Vol.2; ON: DE84003669
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Powerplant productivity improvements and regulatory incentives
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