Nuclear material accountancy and data verification (the muf-d-problem)
According to general agreement international nuclear material safeguards are organized in such a way that the plant operators generate all data necessary for the establishment of a material balance, that the inspectors verify the operator's data with the help of independent measurements and that - if there are no significant differences between the operator's data and the inspector's findings - the material balance is established with the help of the operator's data. This procedure implies two tests of significance: one difference test (D-test) for the comparison of the operator's and the inspector's data and one for the material balance establishment (MUF-test). In this paper these two test procedures as well as their combination, under the boundary condition of a given overall false alarm probability, are analyzed. The results are illustrated with the help of a concrete example. 15 refs.
- Research Organization:
- Hochsch der Bundeswehr Munich, Ger
- OSTI ID:
- 5429809
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-810706-
- Journal Information:
- Nucl. Mater. Manage.; (United States), Journal Name: Nucl. Mater. Manage.; (United States) Vol. 10; ISSN NUMMB
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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