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U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Considerations for handling failed fuel at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant

Conference ·
OSTI ID:5365319
The impact of failed fuel receipt on reprocessing operations is qualitatively described. It appears that extended storage of fuel, particularly with advanced storage techniques, will increase the quantity of failed fuel, the nature and possibly the configuration of the fuel. The receipt of failed fuel at the BNFP increases handling problems, waste volumes, and operator exposure. If it is necessary to impose special operating precautions to minimize this impact, a loss in plant throughput will result. Hence, ideally, the reprocessing plant operator would take every reasonable precaution so that no failed fuel is received. An alternative policy would be to require that failed fuel be placed in a sealed canister. In the latter case the canister must be compatible with the shipping cask and suitable for in-plant storage. A required inspection of bare fuel would be made at the reactor prior to shipping off-site. This would verify fuel integrity. These requirements are obviously idealistic. Due to the current uncertain status of reprocessing and the need to keep reactors operating, business or governmental policy may be enacted resulting in the receipt of a negotiated quantity of non-standard fuel (including failed fuel). In this situation, BNFP fuel receiving policy based soley on fuel cladding integrity would be difficult to enforce. There are certain areas where process incompatibility does exist and where a compromise would be virtually impossible, e.g., canned fuel for which material or dimensional conflicts exist. This fuel would have to be refused or the fuel would require recanning prior to shipment. In other cases, knowledge of the type and nature of the failure may be acceptable to the operator. A physical inspection of the fuel either before shipment or after the cask unloading operation would be warranted. In this manner, concerns with pool contamination can be identified and the assembly canned if deemed necessary.
Research Organization:
Allied-General Nuclear Services, Barnwell, SC (USA)
DOE Contract Number:
AC09-78ET35900
OSTI ID:
5365319
Report Number(s):
AGNS-35900-CONF-169; CONF-820609-40; ON: DE82016790
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English