Fissile material production potential in South Asia

Journal Article · Wed Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1997 · Science and Global Security

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08929889708426437· OSTI ID:535167

Nayyar, A H; Toor, A H ^[1]; Mian, Z ^[2]

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1. Quaid-i-Azam Univ., Islamabad (Pakistan)
2. Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad (Pakistan)

The cases of India and Pakistan show how civilian nuclear activities could potentially contribute significantly to the production of weapons-grade fissile materials. The paper estimates the amount of weapons-grade plutonium that could have been produced from unsafeguarded power reactors in India if these reactors were operated deliberately for this purpose, and the rate at which Pakistan could accumulate weapons-grade uranium if it used its stockpile of low-enriched uranium as feed material to its enrichment facilities. These estimates are not judgments of what these countries have actually done or intend to do, but are forwarded to call attention to an issue that will have to be addressed under a fissile material production cutoff in South Asia and elsewhere. The prospect of a Fissile Material Cut-off convention raises important questions about the accumulated fissile material stocks in countries which are known to have nuclear weapons capability. We look here at the cases of India and Pakistan. These two countries have followed different routes to produce fissile material: India has reprocessed spent fuel from nuclear reactors to extract plutonium, while Pakistan has relied on uranium enrichment. While there are estimates available of weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) production in India, they have assumed that the Indian nuclear power program has made no contribution to such production. Similarly, estimates for uranium enrichment in Pakistan have focused on production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and not examined the stockpiling of low enriched uranium (LEU) and the time it would take to turn such stockpiled material into weapons-grade material. 24 refs., 5 tabs.

• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE
• OSTI ID: 535167
• Journal Information: Science and Global Security, Journal Name: Science and Global Security Journal Issue: 2 Vol. 6; ISSN 0892-9882; ISSN SGSEE8
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

35 ARMS CONTROL
ARMS CONTROL
ASIA
FISSILE MATERIALS
RISK ASSESSMENT