Independent verification of a material balance at a LEU fuel fabrication plant. Program for technical assistance to IAEA safeguards
This report describes the application of methodology for planning an inspection according to the procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an example evaluation of data representative of low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Included are the inspection plan test criteria, the inspection sampling plans, the sample data collected during the inspection, acceptance testing of physical inventories with test equipment, material unaccounted for (MUF) evaluation, and quantitative statements of the results and conclusions that could be derived from the inspection. The analysis in this report demonstrates the application of inspection strategies which produce quantitative results. A facility model was used that is representative of large low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication plants with material flows, inventory sizes, and compositions of material representative of operating commercial facilities. The principal objective was to determine and illustrate the degree of assurance against a diversion of special nuclear materials (SNM) that can be achieved by an inspection and the verification of material flows and inventories. This work was performed as part of the USA program for technical assistance to the IAEA. 10 figs, 14 tables.
- Research Organization:
- Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs., Richland, Wash. (USA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- EY-76-C-06-1830
- OSTI ID:
- 5246565
- Report Number(s):
- PNL-2418: ISPO-7
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
055001 -- Nuclear Fuels-- Safeguards
Inspection
& Accountability-- Technical Aspects
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
ACTINIDES
ELEMENTS
ENRICHED URANIUM
FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
INSPECTION
ISOTOPE ENRICHED MATERIALS
MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR
METALS
MONITORING
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
SAFEGUARDS
SLIGHTLY ENRICHED URANIUM
URANIUM