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Title: Nuclear deterrence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A case study in Egyptian-Israeli relations

Thesis/Dissertation ·
OSTI ID:5199906

In order to achieve security and stability, and maximize the chances for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, should Egypt and Israel adopt declared nuclear deterrence doctrines. Or would such a move be ineffective, dangerous, or even disastrous. The nuclearization of the Middle East is not necessary: military threats to the survival of the states in the region do not justify the introduction of nuclear weapons. Nuclearization is not desirable: deterrence theory's assumptions and implications exhibit intellectual weakness and its explanatory power is unsatisfactory; nuclear deterrence may reduce the frequency of war, but it pays little attention to the consequences of war; and in comparison to defense, nuclear deterrence may lack credibility. Presently, Israel has nuclear capability and delivery systems sufficient to provide security to its vital areas through deterrence of or defense against Arab attacks. The Arabs do not, however, believe that such security extends to the Arab territories occupied by Israel during the June 1967 war. To supply security, nuclear deterrence must be effective, stable, and credible. In a multinuclear environment, the Egyptians and Israelis are likely to meet the requirement for an effective deterrence: the possession of a nuclear capability sufficient to inflict an enormous amount of death and destruction. If the Arabs and Israelis sought and adopted strategies of deterrence, they might be able to meet the requirement for a stable deterrence: the acquisition of second strike capabilities.

Research Organization:
Columbia Univ., New York (USA)
OSTI ID:
5199906
Resource Relation:
Other Information: Thesis (Ph. D.)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English