Efficiency and equity of electricity price regulation: a two-part tariff framework

Thesis/Dissertation · Tue Jan 01 04:00:00 EST 1985

OSTI ID:5110623

Naughton, M C

Electricity price regulation is analyzed, which evaluates regulation by both the efficiency of prices within each customer class and the equity of prices between customer classes. Beyond analyzing the efficiency and equity of prices, the issues of regulatory effectiveness and regulatory motivations are addressed. In order to address the above issues, a model of the industry is designed that consists of a demand section, a cost section, and a set of pricing equations that relate demand to cost for each customer class. The demand and cost equations explicitly incorporate the two-part tariff nature of prices, allowing for the estimation of output and connection demand elasticities with respect to the per-unit and fixed prices and the estimation of output and connection marginal costs. The pricing equations are developed by extending the current work on optimal two-part tariffs to explicitly incorporate the possibility of alternative motivation on the part of regulators. The estimating model enables nested hypotheses testing of the motivations of regulators. The model is estimated with data from a 1980 cross section of 78 privately-owned electric utilities. The estimation results indicate that the motivations of regulators are best described by the economic theory of regulation. This theory states that regulators allocate benefits among various interest groups until marginal political support is equal across groups.

• Research Organization: Boston Coll., Chestnut Hill, MA (USA)
• OSTI ID: 5110623
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY
293000 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Policy
Legislation
& Regulation
296000* -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Electric Power
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMICS
EFFICIENCY
ELECTRIC POWER
MATHEMATICAL MODELS
POWER
PRICES
REGULATIONS
SECTORAL ANALYSIS