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Title: B Plant/WESF suspect/counterfeit parts identification program

Abstract

This document describes a suspect/counterfeit parts inspection program required by DOE conducted in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J.A. O`Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/ Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994. The program included: physical inspection of all spare parts inventories within the plant; screening of installed B Plant/WESF (Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility) systems for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences; and a physical inspection based upon this screening.

Authors:
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Westinghouse Hanford Co., Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
501257
Report Number(s):
WHC-SD-WM-IP-009
ON: DE97052326; TRN: 97:018309
DOE Contract Number:
AC06-96RL13200
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Resource Relation:
Other Information: PBD: 12 Jan 1996
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
05 NUCLEAR FUELS; NUCLEAR FACILITIES; EQUIPMENT; RADIOACTIVE WASTE FACILITIES; HANFORD RESERVATION; ENCAPSULATION; QUALITY ASSURANCE; INSPECTION

Citation Formats

Mertz, D.W. B Plant/WESF suspect/counterfeit parts identification program. United States: N. p., 1996. Web. doi:10.2172/501257.
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Mertz, D.W. B Plant/WESF suspect/counterfeit parts identification program. United States. doi:10.2172/501257.
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Mertz, D.W. Fri . "B Plant/WESF suspect/counterfeit parts identification program". United States. doi:10.2172/501257. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/501257.
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@article{osti_501257,
title = {B Plant/WESF suspect/counterfeit parts identification program},
author = {Mertz, D.W.},
abstractNote = {This document describes a suspect/counterfeit parts inspection program required by DOE conducted in accordance with Internal Memo 16710-94-DWM-048, J.A. O`Brien to J. N. Nansen, B Plant Suspect/ Counterfeit Parts Action Plan, dated May 24, 1994. The program included: physical inspection of all spare parts inventories within the plant; screening of installed B Plant/WESF (Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility) systems for applications where the use and subsequent potential failure of suspect/counterfeit parts could have critical consequences; and a physical inspection based upon this screening.},
doi = {10.2172/501257},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Fri Jan 12 00:00:00 EST 1996},
month = {Fri Jan 12 00:00:00 EST 1996}
}
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Technical Report:
View Technical Report (10.73 MB)
DOI:  10.2172/501257
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  • To address the potential threat that suspect/counterfeit parts could pose to DOE workers and the public, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight initiated a number of activities beginning in mid-1995. Oversight placed increased emphasis on the field`s quality assurance-suspect/counterfeit parts programs during safety management evaluations, in keeping with the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) oversight responsibilities, which include oversight of the Department`s quality assurance (QA) programs. In addition, Oversight reviewed relevant policy documents and occurrence reports to determine the nature and magnitude of the problem within the Department. The results of that review, contained inmore » an Office of Oversight report, Independent Oversight Analysis of Suspect/Counterfeit Parts Within the Department of Energy (November 1995), indicate a lack of consistency and comprehensiveness in the Department`s QA-suspect/counterfeit parts program. A detailed analysis of the causes and impacts of the problem was recommended. In response, this review was initiated to determine the effectiveness of the Department`s QA program for suspect/counterfeit parts. This study goes beyond merely assessing and reporting the status of the program, however. It is the authors intention to highlight the complex issues associated with suspect/counterfeit parts in the Department today and to present approaches that DOE managers might consider to address these issues.« less

  • These guidelines are intended to assist users of products in identifying: substandard, misrepresented, or fraudulently marked items. The guidelines provide information about such topics as: precautions, inspection and testing, dispositioning identified items, installed inspection and reporting suspect/counterfeit materials. These guidelines apply to users who are developing procurement documents, product acceptance/verification methods, company procedures, work instructions, etc. The intent of these SM guidelines in relation to the Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) and implementing company Management Control Procedures is not to substitute or replace existing requirements, as defined in either the QAPD or company implementing instructions (Management Control Procedures). Instead, themore » guidelines are intended to provide a consolidated source of information addressing the issue of Suspect/Counterfeit materials. These guidelines provide an extensive suspect component listing and suspect indications listing. Users can quickly check their suspect items against the list of manufacturers products (i.e., type, LD. number, and nameplate information) by consulting either of these listings.« less

  • Department of Energy (DOE) Order (O) 440.1, Worker Protection Management For DOE Federal and Contractors Employees, [7] sets forth requirements for DOE and its contractors to implement suspect and counterfeit items (S/CI) controls as part of the quality assurance (QA) programs required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.120 [8] or DOE 5700.6C, Quality Assurance [9]. DOE G-830.120, Implementation Guide for Use with 10 CFR Part 830.120, Quality Assurance, [10] provides additional guidance on establishing and implementing effective QA processes to control S/CIs. DOE O 232.1, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations, [11] specifies requirements for reporting S/CIs undermore » the DOE Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS). DOE promulgated the requirements and guidance to control or eliminate the hazards posed by S/CIs, which can lead to unexpected equipment failures and undue risks to the DOE mission, the environment, and personnel. This Guide is a compendium of information contained in the referenced DOE directives and other documents concerning S/CI controls. It incorporates, updates, and supersedes earlier guidance issued in Plan for the Suspect/Counterfeit Products Issue in the Department of Energy, dated October 1993, [4] and in memoranda issued by Defense Programs (DP) [12-16] and other DOE program offices. This guidance was developed to strengthen the procurement process, identify and eliminate S/CIs, and improve the reporting of S/CIs. The information in this Guide, when implemented by DOE and its contractors, will satisfy the S/CI requirements contained in the referenced DOE directives.« less

  • This plan is designed to provide an appropriate level of confidence that Tank Farm Transition Projects (TFTP) facilities will be evaluated to assess the presence of suspect/counterfeit items. It is intended to identify suspect/counterfeit items that are presently in inventory and provide for the reporting and disposition of those items. Items which have been installed will also receive appropriate evaluation using a graded approach to achieve optimum results balanced against safety considerations and cost effectiveness.

  • ;
    Counterfeiting of industrial and commercial grade items is an international problem that places worker safety, program objectives, expensive equipment, and security at risk. In order to prevent the introduction of Suspect/Counterfeit Items (S/CI), this information sheet is being made available as a guide to assist in the implementation of S/CI awareness and controls, in conjunction with subcontractor's/supplier's quality assurance programs. When it comes to counterfeit goods, including industrial materials, items, and equipment, no market is immune. Some manufactures have been known to misrepresent their products and intentionally use inferior materials and processes to manufacture substandard items, whose properties can significantlymore » cart from established standards and specifications. These substandard items termed by the Department of Energy (DOE) as S/CI, pose immediate and potential threats to the safety of DOE and contractor workers, the public, and the environment. Failure of certain systems and processes caused by an S/CI could also have national security implications at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Nuclear Safety Rules (federal Laws), DOE Orders, and other regulations set forth requirements for DOE contractors to implement effective controls to assure that items and services meet specified requirements. This includes techniques to implement and thereby minimizing the potential threat of entry of S/CI to LANL. As a qualified supplier of goods or services to the LANL, your company will be required to establish and maintain effective controls to prevent the introduction of S/CI to LANL. This will require that your company warrant that all items (including their subassemblies, components, and parts) sold to LANL are genuine (i.e. not counterfeit), new, and unused, and conform to the requirements of the LANL purchase orders/contracts unless otherwise approved in writing to the Los Alamos National Security (LANS) contract administrator/procurements specialist.« less