Market power in electric utility mergers: Access, energy, and the guidelines
- California State Univ., Fullerton, CA (United States)
All mergers affect competition, some by creating superior competitors and others by creating potential monopolists. The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires prescreening of proposed mergers to identify those that are likely to affect competition adversely. To implement that law, the US Department of Justice`s merger guidelines contain prescreening procedures that attempt a compromise between theoretical rigor, limited data, expeditious processing and consistency. This article discusses the following topics: the guidelines and their relevence, the problems encountered in applying them to electricity markets; FERC`s merger policy and deemphasizing antitrust markets for capacity and energy; critique of capacity and energy markets; general considerations of antitrust activism; general conclusions on the relationship between regulation and antitrust.
- OSTI ID:
- 478340
- Journal Information:
- Energy Law Journal, Journal Name: Energy Law Journal Journal Issue: 2 Vol. 17; ISSN 0270-9163; ISSN ELJOEA
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Mergers and market power: Should antitrust rule?
FERC must fix its electric utility merger policy