NS SAVANNAH REPLACEMENT CONTROL ROD DRIVES SAFEGUARDS REPORT. VOLUME II. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS AND HAZARDS ANALYSIS
The automatically programmed rods operate in a sequence that produces a virtually linear relationship between added reactivity and cumulative rod withdrawal. An evaluation of potential system failures showed that no credible failure prevents safety action from occurring or causes intolerable power peaking by upsetting the rod programming. The maximum potential reactivity addition rate under accident conditions is slightly higher in the replacement drive system than in the original system. Also, scram time is slower under abnormal conditions. Evaluation of the effect of these changes on the power plant accident analysis showed that the maximum potential reactivity addition rate is less than one tenth of that at which core damage or excessive primary system pressure occurs. Except for a major rupture of the primary system the core is protected from damage and the primary system from excessive pressure during any credible accident, even under abnormally slow scram conditions. A major rupture of the primary system is the maximum credible accident. Installation of the replacement control rod drives neither changes the consequence of this accident nor increases its probability of occurring. Therefore, it is concluded that the replacement control rod drives can be used on the Savannah without causing undue hazard to the public. (auth)
- Research Organization:
- Babcock and Wilcox Co. Atomic Energy Div., Lynchburg, Va.
- DOE Contract Number:
- AT(30-1)-2721
- NSA Number:
- NSA-17-026844
- OSTI ID:
- 4700692
- Report Number(s):
- BAW-1249(Vol.II)
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: Orig. Receipt Date: 31-DEC-63
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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