SAFEGUARDS ASPECTS OF PWR REACTOR COOLANT CHEMISTRY

Technical Report · Sat Jun 01 04:00:00 EDT 1957

OSTI ID:4326310

Lindsay, W T

In the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) light water serves as both moderator and as coolant. The water at the same time participates in a variety of chemical process of concern in the design and operation of the reactor. These include corrosion of the primary coolant system, mechanisms, and fuel elements; radiation chemical reactions involving dissociation and synthesis; nuclear reactions and induced radioactivity; transport and fouling due to formation of plant corrosion products, and fuel element failure and release of fission products. Each of these processes involves potentially undesirable consequences for pressurized water reactors. In the development of PWR in particular, and pressurized water reactors in general, these processes have been examined, and water conditions and plant systems have been developed to reduce the extent and consequences of these processes to acceptable levels. The considerations involved in normal plant operation, with normal water conditions are discussed first. Secondly, the results of possible temporary variations from the desired mode of operation are considered in terms of their effect on plant safety. Some of the water conditions which may result from improper operation can have undesirable effects, such as increased general corrosion, causing accelerated fouling of heat transfer surfaces or decreased accessibility resulting from radioactive contamination of plant internal surfaces. However, no plausible deviation from the normal water conditions will have immediate undesirable effects, with the result that temporary excursions from the desired set of conditions may be tolerated for the period of time required for detection of the devistion and correction to the desired conditions. Nevertheless, since corrosion, fouling and contamination are cumulative processes, every effort is made to reduce to a minimum the period during which the plant may be operating with water conditions other than normal. The consequences of fuel element failure are discussed. It is shown that operational limitations will not arise which can deny access if as many as 1000 blanket fuel rods contain defects in the cladding. (auth)

• Research Organization: Westinghouse Electric Corp. Bettis Plant, Pittsburgh
• DOE Contract Number: AT(11-1)-GEN-14
• NSA Number: NSA-12-002533
• OSTI ID: 4326310
• Report Number(s): WAPD-SC-546
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

BLANKETS
CHEMICAL REACTIONS
CONTAMINATION
COOLANT LOOPS
CORROSION
DECOMPOSITION
FAILURES
FISSION PRODUCTS
FUEL CANS
FUEL ELEMENTS
HEAT TRANSFER
LEAK DETECTORS
MECHANICS
NUCLEAR REACTIONS
OPERATION
PHYSICS
PLANNING
PRESSURE
PWR
RADIATION CHEMISTRY
RADIOACTIVITY
REACTOR SAFETY
REACTORS
RESIDUES
SURFACES
TRANSPORT
WATER COOLANT
WATER MODERATOR