Nuclear explosion source terms for CTBT monitoring
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
Detection of radionuclides from a suspected nuclear explosion is required to provide absolute proof that the event was nuclear. Various evasion scenarios could be employed to attempt to hide the radionuclide signals. We will present estimates of the possible reduction in specific gaseous and particulate fission products for explosion scenarios from underground to underwater and the use of rain storms that a potential CTBT violator might employ to evade detection. We will consider the effect that the chemical behavior of the fission products that are initially formed in nuclear explosions will have on the possible release and transport of the longer-lived fission products that would actually be measured by remote monitoring stations or by using on-site inspection techniques.
- OSTI ID:
- 370688
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-960376-; TRN: 96:003805-0748
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Spring national meeting of the American Chemical Society (ACS), New Orleans, LA (United States), 24-28 Mar 1996; Other Information: PBD: 1996; Related Information: Is Part Of 211th ACS national meeting; PB: 2284 p.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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