Resolution of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Issue for the Hanford Site High-Level Waste Tanks

Conference · Sat Mar 01 23:00:00 EST 1997

OSTI ID:325635

Bratzel, D. R. ^[1]; Serne, R. J. ^[2]; Sohn, C. L. ^[3]; Schulz, W. W. ^[4]; Babad, H. ^[5]; Vornehm, R. ^[6]

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1. Duke Engineering & Services Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States)
2. Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
3. USDOE Richland Operations Office (RO)
4. W2S Company, Albuquerque, NM (United States)
5. Babad Technical Services, Richland, WA (United States)
6. Hanford Site (HNF), Richland, WA (United States)

This paper describes the approach used to resolve the Nuclear Criticality Safety Issue for the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks. Although operational controls have been in place at the Hanford Site throughout its operating life to minimize the amount of fissile material discarded as waste, estimates of the total amount of plutonium that entered the waste tanks range from 500 to 1,000 kg. Nuclear criticality safety concerns were heightened in 1991 based on a review of waste analysis results and a subsequent U.S. Department of Energy 1399 review of the nuclear criticality program. Although the DOE review team concluded that there was no imminent risk of a criticality at the Hanford Site tank farms, the team also stated its concern regarding the lack of definitive knowledge of the fissile material inventory and distribution within the waste tanks and the lack of sufficient management support for the overall criticality safety program. An in-depth technical review of the nuclear criticality safety of the waste tanks was conducted to develop a defensible technical basis to ensure that waste tanks are subcritical. The review covered all relevant aspects of nuclear criticality safety including neutronics and chemical and physical phenomena of the waste form under aging waste conditions as well as during routine waste management operations. This paper provides a review of the technical basis to support the conclusion that given current plutonium inventories and operating conditions, a nuclear criticality is incredible. The DOE has been requested to close the Nuclear Criticality Safety Issue. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is currently reviewing the technical basis.

• Research Organization: Duke Engineering & Services Hanford, Inc., Richland, WA (United States); Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); USDOE Richland Operations Office (RO); W2S Company, Albuquerque, NM (United States); Babad Technical Services, Richland, WA (United States); Hanford Site (HNF), Richland, WA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP); USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
• DOE Contract Number: AC06-96RL13200
• OSTI ID: 325635
• Report Number(s): HNF-SA--3130-FP; CONF-970335--; ON: DE98059557; BR: EW3120071
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES
CRITICALITY
Double-Shell Tanks (DST)
Fissile Material
Fluid Dynamic Processes
Geometry
Neutron Absorbers
Neutron Moderation
Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)
PLUTONIUM
RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE
SAFETY ANALYSIS
Single-Shell Tanks (SST)
TANKS
Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQ)