Alternative implementations of electric power auctions
- Iowa State Univ., Ames, IA (United States). Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Auctions are considered pricing mechanism of choice for the competitive electric power market. This paper outlines alternative structures for auction implementation. The issue of choosing between single-sided and double-sided auctions is discussed in this paper. To ensure the reliability of the power system, some ancillary services must be provided. this paper addresses various issues of ancillary services; for example, which ancillary services should be bundled and which should be unbundled (i.e., traded under separate contracts). Previous research has indicated that auctions can be formulated as a linear program and this linear program can be solved efficiently. However, when mixed integer solutions are required, it may be impossible to formulate the problem as a linear program. The authors discuss factors concerning this problem and attempt to identify whether auctions are required to implement as a mixed integer program.
- OSTI ID:
- 319011
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-980426-; TRN: IM9909%%155
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: American power conference, Chicago, IL (United States), 14-16 Apr 1998; Other Information: PBD: 1998; Related Information: Is Part Of Proceedings of the American Power Conference: Volume 60-1; McBride, A.E. [ed.] [Illinois Inst. of Tech., Chicago, IL (United States)]; PB: 613 p.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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