Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications
- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
- Korea Inst. of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
- Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (Australia)
Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.
- Research Organization:
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
- DOE Contract Number:
- NA0003525
- OSTI ID:
- 3001111
- Report Number(s):
- SAND--2025-13625R; 1789004
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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