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Title: Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials

Abstract

The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms.more » Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information.« less

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Assistant Secretary for Management and Administration, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
296653
Report Number(s):
LA-UR-98-2041; CONF-9805128-
ON: DE99000740; TRN: 99:002457
DOE Contract Number:  
W-7405-ENG-36
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: 20. ESARDA annual meeting with seminar on modern verification techniques: similarities, synergies and challenges, Helsinki (Finland), 11-15 May 1998; Other Information: PBD: [1998]
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
05 NUCLEAR FUELS; 21 NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS; NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; NONDESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS; VERIFICATION; NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY; PLUTONIUM; URANIUM

Citation Formats

Tape, J W, Eccleston, G W, and Yates, M A. Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials. United States: N. p., 1998. Web.
Tape, J W, Eccleston, G W, & Yates, M A. Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials. United States.
Tape, J W, Eccleston, G W, and Yates, M A. Tue . "Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/296653.
@article{osti_296653,
title = {Measurement techniques for the verification of excess weapons materials},
author = {Tape, J W and Eccleston, G W and Yates, M A},
abstractNote = {The end of the superpower arms race has resulted in an unprecedented reduction in stockpiles of deployed nuclear weapons. Numerous proposals have been put forward and actions have been taken to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions, including unilateral initiatives such as those made by President Clinton in September 1993 to place fissile materials no longer needed for a deterrent under international inspection, and bilateral and multilateral measures currently being negotiated. For the technologist, there is a unique opportunity to develop the technical means to monitor nuclear materials that have been declared excess to nuclear weapons programs, to provide confidence that reductions are taking place and that the released materials are not being used again for nuclear explosive programs. However, because of the sensitive nature of these materials, a fundamental conflict exists between the desire to know that the bulk materials or weapon components in fact represent evidence of warhead reductions, and treaty commitments and national laws that require the protection of weapons design information. This conflict presents a unique challenge to technologists. The flow of excess weapons materials, from deployed warheads through storage, disassembly, component storage, conversion to bulk forms, and disposition, will be described in general terms. Measurement approaches based on the detection of passive or induced radiation will be discussed along with the requirement to protect sensitive information from release to unauthorized parties. Possible uses of measurement methods to assist in the verification of arms reductions will be described. The concept of measuring attributes of items rather than quantitative mass-based inventory verification will be discussed along with associated information-barrier concepts required to protect sensitive information.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/296653}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {1998},
month = {12}
}

Conference:
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