U.S. second line of defense: preventing nuclear smuggling across Russia's borders

Conference · Mon Nov 16 04:00:00 EST 1998

OSTI ID:2772

Ball, D Y ^[1]

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1. LLNL

Preventing the theft of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia is one of the central security concerns facing the US today. The dissolution of the highly centralized USSR and the resulting societal crisis has endangered Russia's ability to protect its more than 200 metric tons of plutonium and 1000 tons of highly enriched uranium (roughly 8 kg Pu or 25 kg HEU is sufficient to make a bomb). Producing this fissile material is the most difficult and expensive part of nuclear weapons production and the US must make every effort to ensure that fissile material (and nuclear-related technologies) does not reach the hands of terrorist groups, rogue states or other potential proliferators. In response to this concern, the US has undertaken a number of initiatives in partnership with Russia and other FSU states to prevent the theft of fissile material. The Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program (MPC&A) was begun in 1993 to prevent the theft of nuclear materials from Russian civilian complexes, that is facilities not under control of the Ministry of Defense, which is largely responsible for possession and oversight of nuclear weapons. The MPC&A program is considered the first line of defense against theft of nuclear material because its goal is to prevent theft of material at production and storage facilities. This year the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated a new program called the Second Line of Defense (SLD), the goal of which is to assist Russia in preventing the smuggling of nuclear material and weapons at its borders, either by land, sea or air. The SLD program represents an important phase in the overall effort to ensure the security of nuclear material and weapons in Russia. However, as the US engages Russian customs officials in this important project, Americans should keep in mind that providing equipment--even indigenous equipment--is insufficient by itself; material aid must be accompanied by rigorous inspection and accounting procedures. In addition, the equipment must be assessed according to international standards to ensure a high degree of confidence in its nuclear detection capability.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (US)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE Office of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN) (US)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 2772
• Report Number(s): UCRL-JC-132455; GJ0800000; GJ0800000
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
FISSILE MATERIALS
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PLUTONIUM
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SECURITY
STORAGE FACILITIES
THEFT