Enhancing Nuclear and Radiological Security in Polarized Times: Safeguarding Against Extremist Insider Threats

Journal Article · Mon Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2024 · International Journal of Nuclear Security

DOI:https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns09317753· OSTI ID:2567016

Baweja, Jessica ^[1]; Dunning, Madelyn ^[1]; Rogers, Keithan ^[1]

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1. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

Domestic violent extremism has been on the rise in recent years, fueled by growing political polarization, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the spread of misinformation online. This concerning trend raises an important question: has this increase in extremist violence manifested in more incidents involving radioactive or nuclear (RN) materials and a corresponding security concern? To explore this question, we analyzed existing data on events involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials over time. Specifically, we examined the rate of RN-related incidents, the targets of these events, and the ideologies motivating the perpetrators by using the Violent Non-State Actor Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Event Database from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Our analysis aimed to determine whether the broader rise of violent extremism has translated to an elevated risk of attacks involving RN materials. Results of the analysis revealed that there was no clear increase in events involving RN material in the dataset. However, given the rarity of these events, this conclusion does not indicate that such a trend might not appear in coming years if violent extremism continues to rise. To address the potential risk presented by violent extremism, in addition to quantifying the frequency of RN events, we also reviewed traits that could make organizations more susceptible to insider threats from radicalized employees. Focusing on the literature around counterproductive workplace behavior, we identified organizational characteristics that might increase the risk of malicious acts committed by radicalized insiders. These risk factors include abusive leadership, situational constraints, and organizational injustice. Finally, using these organizational risk characteristics, we discuss interventions that organizations with RN material can take to reduce their risk of attacks stemming from violent extremism while still protecting individual rights to privacy and civil liberties. Overall, this article provides an overview of the intersections between rising domestic extremism, insider threats, and risks posed by RN materials. We present current data on trends and patterns in this space as well as practical guidance for organizational resilience.

• Research Organization: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• Grant/Contract Number: AC05-76RL01830
• OSTI ID: 2567016
• Report Number(s): PNNL-SA--197087
• Journal Information: International Journal of Nuclear Security, Journal Name: International Journal of Nuclear Security Journal Issue: 3 Vol. 9; ISSN 2376-9955
• Publisher: University of Tennessee Institute of Nuclear Security
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
domestic extremism
insider threat
organizational factors
radiological security