Operational Interruption - B Reactor (September 22, 1959)

Technical Report · Thu Oct 08 04:00:00 EDT 1959

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/2532355· OSTI ID:2532355

Johnson, W. E. ^[1]

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1. Hanford Site (HNF), Richland, WA (United States)

B Reactor was scrammed on September 10 and again on September 12 by panellit trips. Subsequent investigations revealed the scrams were caused by small pieces of neoprene in an orifice screen. Extensive checks following the September 12 scram revealed pieces of neoprene in all seven near-side process water header basket screens, in all crossheader screens, and in three process tube orifice screens. The source of the neoprene was found to be a deteriorated curtain seal in the No. 4 process water storage tank, 190 Building. A portion of this seal had fallen into the storage tank and become dispersed throughout the downstream process water supply system. Total outage time required to clean and flush the process water supply system and resume reactor operation was 88.6 hours. Of the total outage time, approximately 40 hours were utilized in the performance of necessary project and maintenance work in the discharge area, which otherwise would have required outage time at later dates.

• Research Organization: Hanford Site (HNF), Richland, WA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
• DOE Contract Number: AC06-87RL10930
• OSTI ID: 2532355
• Report Number(s): HAN--73609; HW--62052; DE92000583
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS
Hanford production reactors
maintenance
neoprene
outages
reactor cooling systems
reactor operation
reactor safety
scram
seals