Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation
- Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.
- Research Organization:
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- NA0003525
- OSTI ID:
- 2462908
- Report Number(s):
- SAND--2024-12645
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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