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Moving-horizon false data injection attack design against cyber–physical systems

Journal Article · · Control Engineering Practice

Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber–physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be capable of bypassing bad data detection (BDD) while causing targeted biases in resulting state estimates. However, their effectiveness against moving horizon estimators (MHE) is not well understood. In fact, this paper shows that conventional FDIAs are generally ineffective against MHE. One of the main reasons is that the moving window renders the static FDIA recursively infeasible. Here, this paper proposes a new attack methodology, moving-horizon FDIA (MH-FDIA), by considering both the performance of historical attacks and the current system’s status. Theoretical guarantees for successful attack generation and recursive feasibility are given. Numerical simulations on the IEEE-14 bus system further validate the theoretical claims and show that the proposed MH-FDIA outperforms state-of-the-art counterparts in both stealthiness and effectiveness. In addition, an experiment on a path-tracking control system of an autonomous vehicle shows the feasibility of the MH-FDIA in real-world nonlinear systems.

Research Organization:
General Electric Co., Boston, MA (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Grant/Contract Number:
CR0000005
OSTI ID:
2417650
Alternate ID(s):
OSTI ID: 1972749
Journal Information:
Control Engineering Practice, Journal Name: Control Engineering Practice Journal Issue: C Vol. 136; ISSN 0967-0661
Publisher:
ElsevierCopyright Statement
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

References (14)

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Moving horizon estimation meets multi-sensor information fusion: Development, opportunities and challenges journal August 2020
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False Data Injection Attacks Against State Estimation Without Knowledge of Estimators journal September 2022
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False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids journal May 2011
Attack-Resilient Weighted $\ell_{1}$ Observer with Prior Pruning conference May 2021
Cyber-Attack Detection in Water Distribution Systems Based on Blind Sources Separation Technique journal March 2021

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