Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

Conference · Sun Jul 01 04:00:00 EDT 2018

OSTI ID:22977860

Stohr, Rebecca; Everton, Craig ^[1]; Cassels, Brad ^[2]; Williams, Geoff ^[3]

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1. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, R G Casey Building, John McEwen Crescent, Barton ACT 0221 (Australia)
2. Victorian Department of Health and Human Services (Australia)
3. IAEA Waste Safety Standards Committee (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA))

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

• Research Organization: WM Symposia, Inc., PO Box 27646, 85285-7646 Tempe, AZ (United States)
• OSTI ID: 22977860
• Report Number(s): INIS-US--20-WM-18607
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AUSTRALIA
CEMENTS
DECOMMISSIONING
DESIGN
IAEA
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
OPTIMIZATION
PLUTONIUM
RADIATION HAZARDS
RADIATION PROTECTION
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION
THORIUM
URANIUM
VERIFICATION