Safety assessment for the radon-type surface disposal facility at Saakadze, Georgia - 15406
- DBE Technology GmbH (Germany)
- TUV NORD, EnSys, Hannover (Germany)
The Saakadze disposal facility is located about 40 km from Tbilisi and was planned and constructed during Soviet times as Radon-type surface facility to accommodate up to 600 m{sup 3} of low and intermediate level waste generated on the territory of Georgia. The disposal facility was operated from 1963 until its closure in 1995. The vast majority of waste in the Saakadze facility has been disposed of in two near surface concrete vaults with typical Radon-type dimensions, which cover layers already show significant structural damages. In order to assess the present safety of the site and provide the competent Georgian authorities with the necessary basis to take decisions in regard to the future of the repository, the European Commission launched and financially supported a project, which was assigned to a consortium of TUV-Nord ENSYS GmbH and DBE Technology GmbH. The safety assessment of Saakadze facility, which was an essential part of this project and which is the subject of this paper was carried out by DBE Technology GmbH. The Government of Georgia has been gradually increasing efforts to improve the regulatory processes and the legislation on nuclear and radiation safety, and, in particular, on safe management of radioactive waste and sealed radioactive sources. Currently, however, there are still areas where specific Georgian laws and regulations do not exist. Accordingly, in certain aspects IAEA recommendations and best practices were used as guidelines for the methodology of the safety assessment. In spite of the large uncertainties to be considered, especially in regard to the inventory, preliminary results of the safety assessment indicate that scenarios related to the groundwater pathway do not lead to radiological impacts that are above or near to limiting values. However, human intrusion scenarios might lead to dose rates for the critical group that are exceeding these values. This is mainly due to the fact that today there is no proper engineered cover on top of the concrete vaults. Based on the comparison of existing options and considering the results of the long-term safety assessment, it is recommended to backfill the remaining voids inside the concrete vaults and to construct an engineered cover to reduce the probability of human intrusion scenarios and to minimize their potential impact. (authors)
- Research Organization:
- WM Symposia, Inc., PO Box 27646, 85285-7646 Tempe, AZ (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 22824316
- Report Number(s):
- INIS-US-19-WM-15406; TRN: US19V0888069362
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: WM2015: Annual Waste Management Symposium, Phoenix, AZ (United States), 15-19 Mar 2015; Other Information: Country of input: France; 3 refs.; available online at: http://archive.wmsym.org/2015/index.html
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
CONCRETES
DOSE RATES
GROUND DISPOSAL
GROUND WATER
IAEA
INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES
INVENTORIES
RADIATION PROTECTION
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL
RADON
RECOMMENDATIONS
REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA
RISK ASSESSMENT
SEALED SOURCES
SHUTDOWN