IAEA safeguards: Perceptions of effectiveness

Conference · Sun Dec 31 04:00:00 EST 1995

OSTI ID:225330

Hill, J; Carlson, J; Bardsley, J ^[1]

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1. Australian Safeguards Office, Queen Victoria Terrace (Australia)

There is a clear need for a verification system to provide assurance to the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation commitments. International safeguards applied by the IAEA fulfill that need. But safeguards` effectiveness and the credibility of the assurances they provide have been the subject of discussion since their inception. And the credibility of those assurances is very important because, to fulfill their role as a confidence building measure, international safeguards must not only be effective but also be perceived to be effective. IAEA NPT safeguards verification comprises a series of technical activities designed to provide assurance and deterrence, and to meet general objectives defined in INFCIRC/153 (corrected). Their scope and intensity are based on the hypothesis that in all States there exists (the same) diversion risk of low but non-zero probability. And, at least up to now, the IAEA has worked on the basis that, to be credible, safeguards activities must be so thorough that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material would be detected with a high probability. This paper examines alternative ways of defining credible and effective international safeguards and suggests ways for reporting on the assurance they provide.

• OSTI ID: 225330
• Report Number(s): CONF-950787--
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

05 NUCLEAR FUELS
COMPLIANCE
EVALUATION
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
IMPLEMENTATION
INSPECTION
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
NUCLEAR MATERIALS DIVERSION
PERFORMANCE
PLANNING
PROLIFERATION