Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

Journal Article · Fri May 09 04:00:00 EDT 2014 · AIP Conference Proceedings

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1063/1.4876468· OSTI ID:22280426

Satkowiak, Lawrence ^[1]

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1. Director, Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security Programs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

• OSTI ID: 22280426
• Journal Information: AIP Conference Proceedings, Journal Name: AIP Conference Proceedings Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 1596; ISSN APCPCS; ISSN 0094-243X
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANTS
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
IAEA
MONITORING
NUCLEAR FUELS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PERIODICITY
PLUTONIUM
POWER REACTORS
PROLIFERATION
REVIEWS
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
SAFEGUARDS
SECURITY
USA
VULNERABILITY