Game theoretic analysis of physical protection system design
- Nuclear and Radiation Engineering Program, University of Texas, 204 E. Dean Keeton Street, Stop C2200, Austin, TX 78712 (United States)
- Operations Research Program, University of Texas, 204 E. Dean Keeton Street, Stop C2200, Austin, TX 78712 (United States)
The physical protection system (PPS) of a fictional small modular reactor (SMR) facility have been modeled as a platform for a game theoretic approach to security decision analysis. To demonstrate the game theoretic approach, a rational adversary with complete knowledge of the facility has been modeled attempting a sabotage attack. The adversary adjusts his decisions in response to investments made by the defender to enhance the security measures. This can lead to a conservative physical protection system design. Since defender upgrades were limited by a budget, cost benefit analysis may be conducted upon security upgrades. One approach to cost benefit analysis is the efficient frontier, which depicts the reduction in expected consequence per incremental increase in the security budget.
- Research Organization:
- American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 22257918
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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