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Title: Generic framework for the secure Yuen 2000 quantum-encryption protocol employing the wire-tap channel approach

Abstract

It is shown that the security, against known-plaintext attacks, of the Yuen 2000 (Y00) quantum-encryption protocol can be considered via the wire-tap channel model assuming that the heterodyne measurement yields the sample for security evaluation. Employing the results reported on the wire-tap channel, a generic framework is proposed for developing secure Y00 instantiations. The proposed framework employs a dedicated encoding which together with inherent quantum noise at the attacker's side provides Y00 security.

Authors:
 [1]
  1. Mathematical Institute, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia and Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Room 1102, Akihabara Daibiru, 1-18-13 Sotokanda, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0021 (Japan)
Publication Date:
OSTI Identifier:
20982503
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Physical Review. A; Journal Volume: 75; Journal Issue: 5; Other Information: DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.75.052334; (c) 2007 The American Physical Society; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSICS; EVALUATION; QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY; QUANTUM INFORMATION; QUANTUM MECHANICS; SECURITY

Citation Formats

Mihaljevic, Miodrag J. Generic framework for the secure Yuen 2000 quantum-encryption protocol employing the wire-tap channel approach. United States: N. p., 2007. Web. doi:10.1103/PHYSREVA.75.052334.
Mihaljevic, Miodrag J. Generic framework for the secure Yuen 2000 quantum-encryption protocol employing the wire-tap channel approach. United States. doi:10.1103/PHYSREVA.75.052334.
Mihaljevic, Miodrag J. Tue . "Generic framework for the secure Yuen 2000 quantum-encryption protocol employing the wire-tap channel approach". United States. doi:10.1103/PHYSREVA.75.052334.
@article{osti_20982503,
title = {Generic framework for the secure Yuen 2000 quantum-encryption protocol employing the wire-tap channel approach},
author = {Mihaljevic, Miodrag J.},
abstractNote = {It is shown that the security, against known-plaintext attacks, of the Yuen 2000 (Y00) quantum-encryption protocol can be considered via the wire-tap channel model assuming that the heterodyne measurement yields the sample for security evaluation. Employing the results reported on the wire-tap channel, a generic framework is proposed for developing secure Y00 instantiations. The proposed framework employs a dedicated encoding which together with inherent quantum noise at the attacker's side provides Y00 security.},
doi = {10.1103/PHYSREVA.75.052334},
journal = {Physical Review. A},
number = 5,
volume = 75,
place = {United States},
year = {Tue May 15 00:00:00 EDT 2007},
month = {Tue May 15 00:00:00 EDT 2007}
}
  • We investigate the Yuen 2000 (so-called Y-00)-protocol, which can realize a randomized stream cipher with high bit rate (Gbit/s) for long distances (several hundreds km). The randomized stream cipher with randomization by quantum noise based on the Y-00 protocol is called a quantum stream cipher in this paper, and it may have security against known plaintext attacks which has no analog with any conventional symmetric key ciphers. We present a simple cryptanalysis based on an attacker's heterodyne measurement and a quantum unambiguous measurement to make clear the strength of the Y-00 protocol in real communication. In addition, we give amore » design for the implementation of an intensity-modulation scheme and report an experimental demonstration of 1 Gbit/s quantum stream cipher through a 20-km-long transmission line.« less
  • There exists a great gap between one-time pad with perfect secrecy and conventional mathematical encryption. The Yuen 2000 (Y00) protocol or {alpha}{eta} scheme may provide a protocol which covers from the conventional security to the ultimate one, depending on implementations. This paper presents the complexity-theoretic security analysis on some models of the Y00 protocol with nonlinear pseudo-random-number-generator and quantum noise diffusion mapping (QDM). Algebraic attacks and fast correlation attacks are applied with a model of the Y00 protocol with nonlinear filtering like the Toyocrypt stream cipher as the running key generator, and it is shown that these attacks in principlemore » do not work on such models even when the mapping between running key and quantum state signal is fixed. In addition, a security property of the Y00 protocol with QDM is clarified. Consequently, we show that the Y00 protocol has a potential which cannot be realized by conventional cryptography and that it goes beyond mathematical encryption with physical encryption.« less
  • The security of two-state quantum-key distribution against individual attack is estimated when the channel has losses and noises. We assume that Alice and Bob use two nonorthogonal single-photon polarization states. To make our analysis simple, we propose a modified B92 protocol in which Alice and Bob make use of inconclusive results, and Bob performs a kind of symmetrization of received states. Using this protocol, Alice and Bob can estimate Eve's information gain as a function of a few parameters that reflect the imperfections of devices, or Eve's disturbance. In some parameter regions, Eve's maximum information gain shows counterintuitive behavior, namely,more » it decreases as the amount of disturbances increases. For a small noise rate, Eve can extract perfect information in the case where the angle between Alice's two states is small or large, while she cannot extract perfect information for intermediate angles. We also estimate the secret key gain, which is the net growth of the secret key per pulse. We show the region where the modified B92 protocol over a realistic channel is secure against individual attack.« less
  • We show that the security proof of the Bennett 1992 protocol over loss-free channel given by Tamaki, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 167904 (2003)] can be adapted to accommodate loss. We assumed that Bob's detectors discriminate between single-photon states on one hand and vacuum state or multiphoton states on the other hand.
  • One of the simplest security proofs of quantum key distribution is based on the so-called complementarity scenario, which involves the complementarity control of an actual protocol and a virtual protocol [M. Koashi, e-print arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)]. The existing virtual protocol has a limitation in classical postprocessing, i.e., the syndrome for the error-correction step has to be encrypted. In this paper, we remove this limitation by constructing a quantum circuit for the virtual protocol. Moreover, our circuit with a shield system gives an intuitive proof of why adding noise to the sifted key increases the bit error rate threshold in the generalmore » case in which one of the parties does not possess a qubit. Thus, our circuit bridges the simple proof and the use of wider classes of classical postprocessing.« less