Comment on 'Quantum direct communication with authentication'
- Department of Physics and Center for Quantum Information Science, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan 70101, Taiwan (China)
- Key Laboratory of Optoelectronic Information Acquisition and Manipulation of Ministry of Education of China, School of Physics and Material Science, Anhui University, Hefei 230039 (China)
Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A 73, 042305 (2006)] were recently proposed by Lee, Lim, and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be prevented from knowing the secret message. The first protocol can be eavesdropped on by Trent using the intercept-measure-resend attack, while the second protocol can be eavesdropped on by Trent using a simple single-qubit measurement. To fix these leaks, we revise the original versions of the protocols by using the Pauli Z operation {sigma}{sub z} instead of the original bit-flip operation X. As a consequence, the attacks we present can be prevented and accordingly the protocol securities are improved.
- OSTI ID:
- 20982204
- Journal Information:
- Physical Review. A, Vol. 75, Issue 2; Other Information: DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.75.026301; (c) 2007 The American Physical Society; Country of input: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); ISSN 1050-2947
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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