Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems
- Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, 1211 Geneva 4 (Switzerland)
- id Quantique SA, 3 Ch. de la Marbrerie, 1227 Carouge/Geneva (Switzerland)
General Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, i.e., attacks on Alice or Bob's system via the quantum channel, are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all systems must implement active counter measures. In particular, all systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any incoming light. We show that such counter measures can be efficient, provided that enough additional privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical way to reduce the maximal information gain that an adversary can gain using Trojan-horse attacks. This does reduce the security analysis of the two-way plug-and-play implementation to those of the standard one-way systems.
- OSTI ID:
- 20974536
- Journal Information:
- Physical Review. A, Journal Name: Physical Review. A Journal Issue: 2 Vol. 73; ISSN 1050-2947; ISSN PLRAAN
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
Security of the Bennett 1992 quantum-key distribution protocol against individual attack over a realistic channel
Phase-remapping attack in practical quantum-key-distribution systems