Intercept-resend attacks in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-distribution protocol with weak coherent pulses

Journal Article · Wed Jun 15 04:00:00 EDT 2005 · Physical Review. A

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.71.062301· OSTI ID:20717866

Curty, Marcos; Luetkenhaus, Norbert ^[1]

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1. Quantum Information Theory Group, Institut fuer Theoretische Physik I, and Max-Planck Research Group, Institute of Optics, Information and Photonics, Universitaet Erlangen-Nuernberg, Staudtstrasse 7/B2, 91058 Erlangen (Germany)

Unconditional security proofs of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol of quantum key distribution have been obtained recently. These proofs cover also practical implementations that utilize weak coherent pulses in the four signal polarizations. Proven secure rates leave open the possibility that new proofs or new public discussion protocols will obtain larger rates over increased distance. In this paper we investigate limits to the error rate and signal losses that can be tolerated by future protocols and proofs.

• OSTI ID: 20717866
• Journal Information: Physical Review. A, Journal Name: Physical Review. A Journal Issue: 6 Vol. 71; ISSN 1050-2947; ISSN PLRAAN
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS
DISTANCE
DISTRIBUTION
ERRORS
INFORMATION THEORY
POLARIZATION
PULSES
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
SECRECY PROTECTION