Bell's inequality, random sequence, and quantum key distribution

Journal Article · Sun May 15 04:00:00 EDT 2005 · Physical Review. A

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.71.052329· OSTI ID:20717740

Hwang, Won-Young ^[1]

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1. Department of Physics Education, Chonnam National University, Kwangjoo 500-757 (Korea, Republic of)

The Ekert 1991 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol appears to be secure regardless of whatever devices legitimate users adopt for the protocol, as long as the devices give a result that violates Bell's inequality. However, this is not the case if they ignore nondetection events because Eve can make use of the detection loophole, as Larrson showed [Quantum Inf. Comput. 2, 434 (2002)]. We show that even when legitimate users take into account nondetection events Eve can successfully eavesdrop if the QKD system has been appropriately designed by the manufacturer. A loophole utilized here is that of 'free choice' (or 'real randomness'). Local QKD devices with a pseudorandom sequence generator installed in them can apparently violate Bell's inequality.

• OSTI ID: 20717740
• Journal Information: Physical Review. A, Journal Name: Physical Review. A Journal Issue: 5 Vol. 71; ISSN 1050-2947; ISSN PLRAAN
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS
BELL THEOREM
DETECTION
DISTRIBUTION
INFORMATION THEORY
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT
RANDOMNESS