Effect of finite detector efficiencies on the security evaluation of quantum key distribution

Journal Article · Thu Apr 01 04:00:00 EST 2004 · Physical Review. A

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.69.042321· OSTI ID:20640967

Curty, Marcos; Luetkenhaus, Norbert ^[1]

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1. Institut fuer Theoretische Physik I, Institut fuer Optik, Information und Photonik (Max-Planck-Forschungsgruppe), Staudtstrasse 7/B3, Universitaet Erlangen-Nuernberg, 91058 Erlangen (Germany)

Quantum key distribution with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in the quantum channel (e.g., loss in the optical fiber) and in the single-photon counters of the receivers. One can argue that the loss in the detectors cannot be changed by an eavesdropper in order to increase the covered distance. Here we show that the security analysis of this scenario is not as easy as is commonly assumed, since already two-photon processes allow eavesdropping strategies that outperform the known photon-number splitting attack. For this reason there is, so far, no satisfactory security analysis available in the framework of individual attacks.

• OSTI ID: 20640967
• Journal Information: Physical Review. A, Journal Name: Physical Review. A Journal Issue: 4 Vol. 69; ISSN 1050-2947; ISSN PLRAAN
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

74 ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR PHYSICS
CORRELATIONS
DISTANCE
DISTRIBUTION
EFFICIENCY
ENERGY LEVELS
EVALUATION
INFORMATION THEORY
MULTI-PHOTON PROCESSES
OPTICAL FIBERS
PHOTONS
PULSES
QUANTUM MECHANICS
SECRECY PROTECTION
SECURITY
SIGNALS